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Abstract
In a proportionate °ow shop problem several jobs have to be processed through a ¯xed sequence of
machines and the processing time of each job is equal on all machines. By identifying jobs with agents,
whose costs linearly depend on the completion time of their jobs, and assuming an initial processing order
on the jobs, we face an additional problem: how to allocate the cost savings obtained by ordering the jobs
optimally? In this paper, PFS games are de¯ned as cooperative games associated to proportionate °ow
shop problems. It is seen that PFS games have a nonempty core. Moreover, it is shown that PFS games
are convex if the jobs are initially ordered in decreasing urgency. For this case an explicit expression for
the Shapley value and a speci¯c type of equal gain splitting rule which leads to core elements of the PFS
game are proposed.
Keywords: Proportionate °ow shop problems, core, convexity.
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1 Introduction
In a °ow shop problem a group of jobs has to be processed through a ¯xed number of machines and the
order of the machines in which the jobs have to be processed is the same for all jobs. To each job a cost
2Corresponding author.
4The author acknowledges the ¯nancial support of Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnolog¶ ³a, FEDER, Xunta de Galicia (projects
BEC2002-04102-C02-02, SEJ2005-07637-C02-02 and PGIDT03PXIC20701PN).
1is associated dependent on its completion time. In this paper we will consider proportionate °ow shop
problems. A proportionate °ow shop problem is a °ow shop problem in which additionally every job has
the same processing time on each machine (e.g. a wooden door needs several layers of paint, each with a
di®erent product, but the painting time is always the same). Proportionate °ow shop problems have gained
considerable attention lately and various papers have been devoted to this topic. In Shakhlevich, Hoogeveen
and Pinedo (1998) an algorithm is provided to obtain an optimal schedule for this kind of problems. Shiau
and Huang (2004) generalize this type of problems by considering multiple identical machines at any stage. In
Allahverdi (1996) and Allahverdi and Savsar (2001) proportionate °ow shop problems with breakdowns and
setup times are studied, respectively. Cheng and Shakhlevich (1999) propose algorithms for proportionate
°ow shop problems where the processing times can be controlled by incurring extra costs.
By associating jobs to clients, a proportionate °ow shop problem gives rise to an interactive decision
making problem. Each client incurs costs, which we assume to depend linearly on the completion time of
its job. By assuming an initial order on the jobs, the ¯rst problem the clients jointly face is an optimization
problem: the problem of ¯nding an optimal reordering of all jobs, i.e., a schedule that maximizes joint cost
savings. The subsequent problem is of a game theoretic nature: how to reallocate these cost savings in a fair
way. By de¯ning the value of a coalition of clients as the maximal attainable costs savings by means of an
optimal admissible reordering, we obtain a cooperative proportionate °ow shop game (a PFS game) related
to the proportionate °ow shop problem. The core of this game provides insight in the allocation problem at
hand since core elements lead to a stable reallocation of the joint cost savings. A game is said to be balanced
if it has a non-empty core.
The above game-theoretic approach to sequencing situations has been initiated by Curiel, Pederzoli and
Tijs (1989) for the class of one-machine sequencing situations. Generalizations to e.g. ready times, due
dates, multiple ownership and more machines have been studied in Hamers, Borm and Tijs (1995); Borm,
Fiestras-Janeiro, Hamers, S¶ anchez and Voorneveld (2002); Calleja, Est¶ evez-Fern¶ andez, Borm and Hamers
(2006); Est¶ evez-Fern¶ andez, Calleja, Borm and Hamers (2004); Hamers, Klijn and Suijs (1999); Calleja, Borm,
Hamers, Klijn and Slikker (2002). A recent review on sequencing games can be found in Curiel, Hamers and
Klijn (2002). Finally, within the context of °ow shop problems, van den Nouweland, Krabbenborg and Potters
(1990) and van den Nouweland (1993) have studied the speci¯c case of a dominant machine.
This article analyzes proportionate °ow shop problems and related PFS games. It is shown that PFS
games are balanced. Moreover, PFS games turn out to be convex if the initial order is the urgency order, in
which case the Shapley value is in the core of the game. We provide an explicit expression for the Shapley
value. Under this assumption, we also provide a context-speci¯c allocation rule (the °-rule) in the same
spirit as the equal gain splitting (EGS) rule introduced in Curiel et al. (1989). This allocation rule follows
the algorithm in Shakhlevich et al. (1998). In this way, the optimization problem of determining the optimal
2order of the grand coalition and the allocation problem of how to share joint savings can be solved in an
integrated way.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the basic de¯nitions and termi-
nology of proportionate °ow shop problems. Moreover, two useful results in Shakhlevich et al. (1998) are
recalled. Section 3 deals with cooperation within proportionate °ow shop problems. The °-rule is introduced
as a speci¯c allocation rule of the maximal joint cost savings. In Section 4 PFS games are de¯ned. It is shown
that these games are convex provided that the initial order is an urgency order and an expression of the
Shapley value is provided. Moreover, it is seen that in this case also the °-rule will provide a core element.
2 Proportionate Flow Shop problems
A °ow shop situation consists of a ¯xed sequence of m machines, and a ¯nite set of jobs N that have to
be processed on all machines. A proportionate °ow shop (PFS) situation is a °ow shop situation where the
processing time of every job is the same on each machine. Hence, a PFS situation can be described by a
3-tuple (M;N;p) with M = fM1;:::;Mmg the set of machines, N = f1;:::;ng the set of jobs, and p 2 RN
+
the vector of processing times of the jobs.
A schedule ¯xes for every job i and every machine r a time interval of length pi in which job i will
be processed in such a way that neither a job is processed on two di®erent machines at the same time,
nor a machine processes two di®erent jobs at the same time. Given a PFS situation (M;N;p) we denote a
schedule of the jobs in the machines as ¾ = (¾1;:::;¾m) with ¾r : N ! f1;:::;jNjg a bijection describing
the processing order in machine Mr. We will denote by ¦(N;M) the set of all schedules of the jobs in the
machines. Given ¾ 2 ¦(N;M), i 2 N, and Mr 2 M, we denote by P(¾r;i) the set of predecessors of job
i in machine Mr, i.e., P(¾r;i) = fj 2 Nj¾r(j) < ¾r(i)g. Further, we de¯ne ¹ P(¾r;i) := P(¾r;i) [ fig.
We denote by p(¾r;i) the immediate predecessor of job i in machine Mr, i.e., p(¾r;i) 2 N such that
¹ P(¾r;p(¾r;i)) = P(¾r;i). Note that in principle the order in machines need not be the same. A schedule
¾ = (¾1;:::;¾m) with ¾1 = ::: = ¾m is called a permutation schedule or order. With minor abuse of
notation, ¾ will then denote the order in each machine. We will denote by ¦(N) the set of all permutations
schedules of the jobs.
Assuming that processing starts at time 0 and that there are no unnecessary delays, the completion time
of job i in machine Mr with respect to an arbitrary schedule ¾, C¾













i (r ¡ 1) + pi if P(¾r;i) = ;,
maxfC¾
p(¾r;i)(r);C¾
i (r ¡ 1)g + pi otherwise.
It is assumed that each job i 2 N incurs costs, ci, which are linear with respect to the time in which the
job leaves the system according to the schedule ¾. Hence, there exist positive numbers ®i, i 2 N, such that
ci(¾) = ®iC¾
i (m). From now on we will denote the overall completion time C¾
i (m) by C¾
i .
Given a PFS situation (M;N;p) and a linear cost associated to each job, which will be represented by
® 2 RN, the associated PFS problem, (M;N;p;®) has as objective to ¯nd a schedule that minimizes the
total cost originated in the system, i.e., ¯nd ^ ¾ such that








i . Note that ¦(N;M) is ¯nite and therefore there exists at least one
optimal solution.
Next, we will recall three lemmas from Shakhlevich et al. (1998) that will be used throughout the article.
Lemma 2.1 (Shakhlevich et al. (1998)). Let (M;N;p;®) be a PFS problem. Then,
(i) Every optimal schedule is a permutation schedule.
(ii) For a permutation schedule ¾ and i 2 N, the completion time C¾





pj + (m ¡ 1) max
j2 ¹ P(¾;i)
fpjg:
Since every optimal schedule is a permutation schedule, we will restrict our study to permutation schedules
from now on.
Example 2.1. Let (M;N;p;®) be a PFS problem with machines M = fM1;M2g, jobs N = f1;2;3;4g,
vector of processing times p = (4;5;6;1), and vector of cost coe±cients ® = (32:5;32;32;5). Let ¾ = (1 2 3 4)
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Figure 1: Gantt Chart of the PFS situation in Example 2.1
4Here, C¾
1 = 8, C¾
2 = 14, C¾
3 = 21 and C¾
4 = 22. We illustrate how to calculate C¾
3 below.
C¾
3 = p1 + p2 + p3 + (m ¡ 1)maxfp1;p2;p3g
= 4 + 5 + 6 + (2 ¡ 1)maxf4;5;6g = 21:
Hence, the total weighted completion time according to ¾ is cN(¾) = 1490. 3
Since the processing time of a job is the same in all machines, we can de¯ne an urgency (index) of job
i 2 N as ui = ®i
pi . The next lemma states that if a job has higher urgency than another with larger processing
time, then the one with higher urgency will be processed ¯rst in an optimal order.
Lemma 2.2 (Shakhlevich et al. (1998)). Let (M;N;p;®) be a PFS problem and ¾ an optimal order. If
i;j 2 N are such that ui ¸ uj and pi < pj or ui > uj and pi · pj, then ¾(i) < ¾(j).
Let (M;N;p;®) be a PFS problem and let ¾ 2 ¦(N). We say that job i 2 N is a new-max job according
to ¾ if pi > maxj2P(¾;i)fpjg. Let a¾
1;:::;a¾
s be the new-max jobs according to ¾, with ¾(a¾
1) < ::: < ¾(a¾
s).
Then, N can be partitioned into s so-called segments A¾
1;:::;A¾








r) if 1 · r < s,
N n P(¾;a¾
r) if r = s:
Note that, since ¾(a¾
1) = 1, P(¾;a¾
1) = ;. The above partition into segments is denoted by Seg(¾).
The lemma below states that in any optimal order the jobs in a segment are processed in decreasing
urgency order.
Lemma 2.3 (Shakhlevich et al. (1998)). Let (M;N;p;®) be a PFS problem and ¾ an optimal order. Let
A¾
r be a segment corresponding to ¾ and i;j 2 A¾
r. If ¾(i) < ¾(j), then ui ¸ uj.
3 Cooperation in proportionate °ow shops
In this section we will recall the algorithm to ¯nd an optimal schedule for PFS problems given in Shakhlevich
et al. (1998) and propose an allocation rule to share the costs savings obtained by reordering the jobs into
an optimal order if the initial order is in decreasing urgency order.
We ¯rst describe the algorithm in Shakhlevich et al. (1998). Let (M;N;p;®) be a PFS problem. We de¯ne
the urgency order, ¾u, as the order in which the jobs are ordered in decreasing urgency. Since the starting
point of the algorithm is ¾u, we can assume without loss of generality that ¾u = (1 ::: n). To ¯nd the
optimal order we will generate orders ^ ¾1;:::; ^ ¾n where ^ ¾1 := ¾u and ^ ¾n is optimal. Note that associated to




s which give a partition of N. Now, we explain how to
5obtain ^ ¾i from ^ ¾i¡1. Let si 2 f1;:::;sg be such that A
^ ¾i¡1
si \f1;:::;i¡1g 6= ; and A
^ ¾i¡1
si+1\f1;:::;i¡1g = ;.
We de¯ne A(i;1);:::;A(i;si) as A(i;1) = A
^ ¾i¡1
si \ f1;:::;i ¡ 1g and A(i;r) = A
^ ¾i¡1
si¡r+1 for r = 2;:::;si.
Here, we have numbered the segments from right to left (instead from left to right) for convenience of
the description of the rule that we will give later on. Subsequently, ^ ¾i is obtained from ^ ¾i¡1 by placing i in
¯rst position or in between two consecutive segments or remain in its initial position. The decision will be
taken in such a way that cN(^ ¾i) is minimal and maxk2 ¹ P(^ ¾i;i)fpkg is maximal.
Now we turn to interactive proportionate °ow shop situations and assume that each job belongs to a
player. We de¯ne the °-rule which allocates the gains
P
i2N(cN(^ ¾i¡1) ¡ cN(^ ¾i)). Here, we will decompose
the gain cN(^ ¾i¡1) ¡ cN(^ ¾i) into \positive jumps" and the associated \positive gains" will be shared among









for r = 1;:::;si, with A(i;si + 1) := ;.
Hence, gA(i;r)i represents the cost savings obtained when job i goes from the tale of A(i;r) to its front.
Note that gA(i;r)i can be negative. De¯ne N(i;1) := A(i;1), gN(i;1) := gA(i;1)i, and hN(i;1) := (gN(i;1))+. For















Easily, c(^ ¾i¡1) ¡ c(^ ¾i) =
Psi




r=1 hN(i;r) gives the total cost savings gained
by means of cooperation. The °-rule simply gives half of hN(i;r) to i while the other half is shared equally














with eR 2 RN a vector of zeros and ones with eR
i = 1 if i 2 R and eR
i = 0 otherwise, for R ½ N.
The following example illustrates the computation of the °-rule.
Example 3.1. Let (M;N;p;®) be a PFS problem with M = fM1;M2;M3g, N = f1;2;3;4;5;6;7;8;9g,
p = (20;30;10;30;10;30;20;10;40) and ® = (200;270;80;210;69;180;130;59;200). Hence, the urgency order
is ¾u = (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9). Suppose that initially the jobs are processed according to the urgency order.
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Figure 2: Gantt Chart of the PFS situation in Example 3.1.
The allocation of the total cost savings after reordering the jobs in the optimal order is summarized in
Table 1.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
i = 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
i = 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
i = 3 600 650 650 + 600 0 0 0 0 0 0
i = 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
i = 5 380 180 0 180 360 + 380 0 0 0 0
i = 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
i = 7 0 550
3 0 550
3 0 550
3 550 0 0
i = 8 13 13 0 13 0 13 13 65 0




3 563 65 0
Table 1: Allocation of the cost savings in Example 3.1.
We explain below how the cost savings are shared when jobs 5 and 8 are reordered.
First, we will study the case in which job 5 is reordered. We leave it to the reader to
verify that the order obtained after reordering jobs 1, 2, 3 and 4 is ^ ¾4 = (3 1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9) and
Seg(^ ¾4) = ff3g;f1g;f2;4;5;6;7;8g;f9gg. Take i = 5 and as previous order ^ ¾4. Hence, A(5;1) = f2;4g,
A(5;2) = f1g, and A(5;3) = f3g. Moreover,



















5 ) = 720;
with ¿1



















5 ) = 760;
7with ¿2



















5 ) = ¡110;
with ¿3
5 = (5 3 1 2 4 6 7 8 9).
Hence, N(5;1) := A(5;1) = f2;4g, gN(5;1) = 720, hN(5;1) = 720, N(5;2) = f1g, gN(5;2) = 760, hN(5;2) = 760,
N(5;3) = f3g, gN(5;3) = ¡110, hN(5;3) = 0. In this step, the owner of job 5 gets 360 from hN(5;1) and the
owners of jobs in N(5;1) share equally 360, i.e., 2 and 4 get 180 each. Similarly, the owner of job 5 gets 380
from hN(5;2) and the owner of the job in N(5;2) gets 380, i.e., 1 gets 380.
Hence, an optimal order after reallocating 5 is ^ ¾5 = ¿2
5 = (3 5 1 2 4 6 7 8 9) and the cost savings obtained
after this reorder are hN(5;1) + hN(5;2) + hN(5;3) = 1480.
Next, we will study the case in which job 8 is reordered. In this case, ^ ¾7 = (3 5 1 7 2 4 6 8 9) and
Seg(^ ¾7) = ff3;5g;f1;7g;f2;4;6;8g;f9gg. Take i = 8 and as previous order ^ ¾7. Here, A(8;1) = f2;4;6g,
A(8;2) = f1;7g, and A(8;3) = f3;5g. Moreover,

























8 ) = ¡110;
with ¿1



























8 ) = 240;
with ¿2
8 = (3 5 8 1 7 2 4 6 9).
Note that job 8 can not be reallocated in an earlier position since it would violate
Lemma 2.2. Hence, N(8;1) := A(8;1) = f2;4;6g, gN(8;1) = ¡110, hN(8;1) = 0, N(8;2) = f1;2;4;6;7g,
gN(8;2) = ¡110+240 = 130, hN(8;2) = 130, N(8;3) = f3;5g, gN(8;3) < 0, hN(8;3) = 0. In this step, the owner
of job 8 gets 65 from hN(8;2) and the owners of jobs in N(8;2) share equally 65, i.e., 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7 get 13
each.
Hence, an optimal order after reallocating 8 is ^ ¾8 = ¿2
8 = (3 5 8 1 7 2 4 6 9) and the cost savings obtained
after this reorder are hN(8;1) + hN(8;2) + hN(8;3) = 130. 3
4 Proportionate °ow shop games
In this section we study proportionate °ow shop games and show that they are balanced. Moreover, if the
initial order is the urgency order, then they are convex and an explicit expression of the Shapley value is
provided based on the decomposition of the proportionate °ow shop games into unanimity games. Besides,
it is shown that the °-rule leads to a core element.
8Before stating our main results we will recall some basic notions from cooperative game theory.
A cooperative TU-game in characteristic function form is an ordered pair (N;v) where N is a ¯nite set
(the set of players) and v : 2N ! R satis¯es v(;) = 0. The core of a cooperative TU-game (N;v) is de¯ned
by






xi ¸ v(S) for all S 2 2Ng,
i.e., the core is the set of e±cient allocations of v(N) such that there is no coalition with an incentive to
split o®. A game is said to be balanced (see Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967)) if the core is nonempty.
An important subclass of balanced games is the class of convex games (cf. Shapley (1971)). A game (N;v)
is said to be convex if
v(S) + v(T) · v(S [ T) + v(S \ T) (4.1)
for all S;T ½ N:
Let (N;v) be a game and let ¼ : f1;:::;jNjg ! N be a bijection. The marginal vector m¼(v), is de¯ned
by
m¼
¼(k)(v) := v(f¼(1);:::;¼(k)g) ¡ v(f¼(1);:::;¼(k ¡ 1)g)
for all k 2 f1;:::;jNjg. It is known that convexity of a game is equivalent to every marginal vector being a
core element (see Shapley (1953) and Ichiishi (1981)). The Shapley value of a game (N;v) is de¯ned as the
average of its marginal vectors.
Next, we start the game theoretical study of proportionate °ow shops. Let (M;N;p;®) be a PFS
problem and let ¾0 2 ¦(N) be an initial order on the jobs. We assume without loss of generality that
¾0 = (1 ::: n). By associating jobs with players (or clients) the associated PFS game (N;v) is de¯ned by
v(S) := max
¾2A(S)
fcN(¾0) ¡ cN(¾)g (4.2)
for every S ½ N, where A(S) is the set of admissible rearrangements for coalition S. An order ¾ 2 ¦(N) is
said to be admissible for coalition S if P(¾0;j) = P(¾;j) for all j 2 N nS. This implies that in an admissible
rearrangement the initial schedule for jobs outside S does not change, i.e., the starting time in each machine
of each player outside S does not change with respect to the initial order. Moreover, agents of S are only
allowed to be reordered within maximally connected components of S with regard to ¾0. Here, a coalition R
is called connected (with respect to ¾0) if for all i;j 2 R and k 2 N such that ¾0(i) < ¾0(k) < ¾0(j) it holds
that k 2 R. Given a coalition S ½ N, we denote by S=¾0 the set of all maximally connected components of
S according to ¾0. Due to the de¯nition of admissible rearrangements, we can write the value of coalition





9It is readily seen that PFS games are ¾0-component additive and therefore balanced (see Curiel et al. (1994)).
Example 4.1. Let (M;N;p;®) be a PFS situation where N = f1;2;3g, M = fM1;M2;M3g, p = (3;1;4)









Figure 3: Gantt Chart of the PFS situation in Example 4.1.
The corresponding PFS game (N;v) is
S ; f1g f2g f3g f1;2g f1;3g f2;3g N
v(S) 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 3
We explain in detail how to calculate the value of coalition f1;2g below. The total cost with the initial
order is cN(¾0) = 158. The set of admissible rearrangements for coalition f1;2g is A(f1;2g) = f¾0;¾1g, with
¾1 = (2 1 3), and the total cost for the order ¾1 is cN(¾1) = 155. Then,
v(f1;2g) = max
¾2f¾0;¾1g
fcN(¾0) ¡ cN(¾)g = maxf0;3g = 3: 3
Note that the initial order in Example 4.1 is not an urgency order. Moreover, the game is balanced but
not convex (take S = f1;2g and T = f2;3g).
From now on we will study PFS games with an urgency order as the initial order, i.e.,
¾0 = ¾u = (1 2 ::: n):
We will give an expression for the value of a coalition based on the cost savings that each player can
obtain if a similar procedure as the method in Section 3 is followed. Due to equation (4.3) we will restrict
our study to connected coalitions. Let S ½ N be a connected coalition, S = fj;j + 1;:::;k ¡ 1;kg. To
¯nd the optimal order for S we will generate orders ^ ¾S
j ;:::; ^ ¾S
k in the following way: ^ ¾S
j := ¾u and ^ ¾S
i is
obtained from ^ ¾S




r \ fj;:::;i ¡ 1g does not contain any
new-max job according to ^ ¾S
i¡1, then i and j belong to the same segment and j is not a new-max job.
10In this case, ^ ¾S




r \ fj;:::;i ¡ 1g contains a new-max job according to ^ ¾S
i¡1










r \fj;:::;i¡1g contains a new-max job according to ^ ¾S
i¡1g, and si = ti¡ri+1. Analogously









ti¡r+1 for r = 2:::si. Subsequently, ^ ¾S
i is obtained by placing i in position j or in between two
consecutive segments or remain in its initial position. The decision will be taken in such a way that
cN(^ ¾S
i ) is minimal and max
k2 ¹ P(^ ¾S
i ;i)
fpkg is maximal. (4.4)









ri , otherwise Lemma 2.2 would be violated. Hence, the value of coalition





i¡1) ¡ cN(^ ¾S
i ))
with ^ ¾S
j¡1 := ¾u. We de¯ne GS
i := cN(^ ¾S
i¡1)¡cN(^ ¾S
i ) for i 2 S. Here, GS
i denotes the cost savings obtained






Note that as a consequence of Lemma 2.2 it follows that if j 2 P(¾u;a), then j 2 P(^ ¾S
i ;a) with a a
new-max job according to ¾u.
Next, we provide some lemmas that will be used in the proofs of our main results. Their proofs can be
found in the appendix. The ¯rst lemma states that, in a PFS problem, the new-max jobs according to the
urgency order remain new-max jobs during the proposed process of ¯nding an optimal order for an arbitrary
coalition S.
Lemma 4.1. Let (M;N;p;®) be a PFS problem and let ¾u be the initial order. Let S ½ N. Then, every
new-max job according to ¾u is also new-max job according to ^ ¾S
i for every i 2 S.
Next, we provide a result on the \monotonicity" of new-max jobs and cost savings.
Lemma 4.2. Let (M;N;p;®) be a PFS problem and let ¾u be the initial order. Let S;T ½ N, with
S ½ T ½ N, be connected coalitions. Let S = fiS;:::;jSg with iS < ::: < jS, and let a be the new-max job
according to ¾u such that pa = maxk2P(¾u;iS)fpkg. Then, the following assertions hold.
(i) ^ ¾T
i (i) = ^ ¾S
i (i) for every i 2 S with pi ¸ pa.
(ii) ^ ¾T
i (i) · ^ ¾S
i (i) for every i 2 S with pi < pa. Moreover, if ^ ¾T
i (i) < ^ ¾S
i (i), then ^ ¾T
i (i) < ^ ¾T
i (a).
(iii) Every new-max job according to ^ ¾S




i . Moreover, if pi ¸ pa, then GS
i = GT
i .
The following lemma states that the cost savings achievable for a coalition by the reallocation of job i
are at most the total cost savings that job i can achieve for the grand coalition during its reallocation.







for all i 2 S.
Next, we will show that the °-rule leads to a core element of the associated PFS game.
Theorem 4.4. Let (M;N;p;®) be a PFS problem and let ¾u be the initial order. Then, the °-rule provides
a core element of the associated PFS game.
Proof. E±ciency holds by de¯nition. Let S ½ N be a connected coalition, then
X
i2S

























































































where (eS)t is the transposed matrix of eS. The ¯rst, second, and third inequalities follow because hN(i;r) ¸ 0
and the last equality is a consequence of Lemma 4.3. 2
The next result gives the decomposition into unanimity games of a PFS game. We denote by fa1;:::;asg,
with a1 < ::: < as, the set of new-max jobs according to ¾u. For i 2 N we denote by r(i) either the index
of the new-max job which precedes i if i is not a new-max job according to ¾u, or the index of i if i is a
new-max job according to ¾u (i.e., i = ar(i)). Consequently, par(i) = maxk2 ¹ P(¾u;i)fpkg.















for every T ½ N, where G
far(k)+1;:::;ng
k is de¯ned as 0.
Proof. Let T ½ N be a connected coalition and set T = fi;:::;jg. We will distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: T \ fa1;:::;asg = ;. Then, ^ ¾T
k (k) = k for all k 2 T by Lemma 2.3 and therefore GT
k = 0 for all
k 2 T. Hence, v(T) = 0. Moreover, far;:::;kg 6½ T for every new-max job ar and every k ¸ ar. Hence,












ufar;:::;kg(T) = 0 = v(T):
Case 2: T \ fa1;:::;asg = fav;:::;awg with av · ::: · aw. Then, ^ ¾T
k (k) = k for all k < av by Lemma 2.3
and ^ ¾T
k (k) = ^ ¾
fav;:::;ng
k (k) for all k ¸ av by the mechanism of the algorithm. Hence, GT






































































where the ¯rst equality follows because if k and r are such that
(i) ar < av · k, then far;:::;kg 6½ fi;:::;jg = T and ufar;:::;kg(T) = 0,
(ii) k > j and ar · k, then far;:::;kg 6½ fi;:::;jg = T and ufar;:::;kg(T) = 0.
The second equality is satis¯ed because if k and r are such that av · ar · ar(k), ar · k · j, then
far;:::;kg ½ fi;:::;jg = T and ufar;:::;kg(T) = 1.





























since the unanimity games are de¯ned for connected coalitions. 2
As a direct consequence of Lemma 4.2 (iv) and Theorem 4.5 we have that PFS games are convex.
Corollary 4.6. PFS games are convex if the initial order is the urgency order.
Proof. By Theorem 4.5 and by Lemma 4.2 (iv) we know that PFS games are decomposed in non-negative
linear combination of unanimity games. Hence, PFS games are convex. 2
If the initial order is an urgency order, PFS games are convex and the Shapley value belongs to the core.
The next result provides a game independent expression of the Shapley value for PFS games.
Theorem 4.7. Let (M;N;p;®) be a PFS problem and let ¾u be the initial order. Then, the Shapley value












for every i 2 N.
The Shapley value of PFS games can be interpreted as follows: player i 2 N needs the players





i equally among all the players involved, i.e., ar(i);:::;i. If a new segment is added to the left of









i ¸ 0 can be obtained by Lemma 4.2 (iv). The Shapley value shares equally these
extra gains among all the players involved, i.e., ar(i)¡1;:::;ar(i);:::;i. Step by step, additive-gains are shared
equally among all who are responsible.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Let a be a new-max job according to ¾u and let i 2 S. Then,
pa>maxj2P(¾u;a)fpjg. We have to show that a is a new-max job according to ^ ¾S
i , i.e., pa>maxj2P(^ ¾S
i ;a)fpjg.
Note that P(¾u;a) ½ P(^ ¾S
i ;a). Moreover, pj < pa for all j 2 P(^ ¾S
i ;a) n P(¾u;a) by Lemma 2.2. Hence,










For the proof of Lemma 4.2, we need the following additional lemmas. The ¯rst lemma is an immediate
consequence of Lemma 2.2 and the de¯nition of new-max job and therefore the proof will be omitted. It
states that a new-max job a according to ¾u does not change its initial position in ^ ¾S
a, for all coalition S ½ N,
a 2 S.
Lemma A.1. Let (M;N;p;®) be a PFS problem and let ¾u be the initial order. Let S ½ N and let a 2 S
be a new-max job according to ¾u. Then, ^ ¾S
a(a) = a.
The following result is a direct consequence of the algorithm. It says that the set of predecessors of a
certain job once reordered can only increase with the consecutive application of the algorithm.
Lemma A.2. Let (M;N;p;®) be a PFS problem and let ¾u be the initial order. Let S ½ N and i;j 2 S
with j < i. Then, P(^ ¾S
j ;j) ½ P(^ ¾S
i ;j).
Next, we will show that if a job becomes new-max job during its reordering, then it will remain new-max
job during the successive application of the algorithm.
Lemma A.3. Let (M;N;p;®) be a PFS problem and let ¾u be the initial order. Let S ½ N and i;j 2 S
with j < i. Then, j is new-max job according to ^ ¾S
i if and only if j is new-max job according to ^ ¾S
j .
Proof. If j is new-max job according to ¾u, then j is new-max job according to ^ ¾S
k for all k 2 S by Lemma 4.1
and the result follows. Hence, we may assume that j is not new-max job according to ¾u.









where the ¯rst inequality follows since j is new-max job according to ^ ¾S
i and the second one by Lemma A.2.
Hence, j is a new-max job according to ^ ¾S
j .
Next, we show the if part. Let j be a new-max job according to ^ ¾S
j . By Lemma A.2 we have that
P(^ ¾S
j ;j) ½ P(^ ¾S
i ;j). Hence, we can write P(^ ¾S
i ;j) = P(^ ¾S
j ;j) [ P(^ ¾S
i ;j) n P(^ ¾S
j ;j). Observe that pj > pk
for all k 2 P(^ ¾S
j ;j) since j is a new-max job according to ^ ¾S
j by assumption. Besides, pj > pk for all
k 2 P(^ ¾S
i ;j) n P(^ ¾S
j ;j) by Lemma 2.2. Hence, j is a new-max job according to ^ ¾S
i . 2
For the proof of Lemma 4.2 we need some additional notation. Let S ½ N, S = fiS;:::;jSg, with
iS < ::: < jS, and i 2 S. We de¯ne BS(i;1);:::;BS(i;si) as BS(i;r) = AS(i;si ¡ r + 1) for every
r 2 f1;:::;sig. We denote by a(i;S) the new-max job according to ^ ¾S
i¡1 such that i is placed at the tail of
15the segment de¯ned by a(i;S) after being reordered. Note that pa(i;S) = maxk2P(^ ¾S
i ;i)fpkg. Let i 2 S and
let a 2 S be a new-max job according to ^ ¾S
i¡1. We denote by r(i;a) the index of the segment de¯ned by a
according to ^ ¾S
i¡1, i.e., r(i;a) 2 f1;:::;sig such that a 2 BS(i;r(i;a)). Moreover, we denote by gBS(i;r)i the
gains obtained when, starting from ^ ¾S
i¡1, we change i from the tail of segment BS(i;r) to the tail of segment


















r(i;a¤) if iS > 1
, where a¤ is the new-max job according to ¾u
such that pa¤ = maxk2P(¾u;iS)fpkg.
Recall that fa1;:::;asg, with a1 < ::: < as, is the set of new-max jobs according to ¾u. Let S ½ N be a
connected coalition, S = fiS;:::;jSg, satisfying:
(i) S \ fa1;:::;asg = fau;:::;avg, with au · ::: · av and au 6= a1;
(ii) there exists l1 2 S verifying the following three conditions
pl1 < pau¡1 (A.2)
au¡1 6= a(l1;S) (A.3)
au¡1 = a(l;S) for every l 2 S with l < l1 and pl < pau¡1: (A.4)
Consider the following partition of S
©
fiS;:::;l1 ¡ 1g;fl1g;fl1 + 1;:::;l2 ¡ 1g;fl2g;:::;flmg;flm + 1;:::;jSg
ª
(A.5)
where pj ¸ pa(lk;S) for every j 2 flk + 1;:::;lk+1 ¡ 1g and every k 2 f1;:::;mg (with lm+1 ¡ 1 := jS), and
lk satisfying plk < pa(lk¡1;S), with l0 := au¡1.
Lemma A.4. The two following assertions hold
(i) for every k;~ k 2 f1;:::;mg with ~ k > k we have




for every r 2 fr(l~ k;a(lk¡1;S)) + 1;:::;r(l~ k;a(lk;S))g with r(l~ k;a(l0;S)) := 0;
(ii) ^ ¾S
l~ k(l~ k) > ^ ¾S
l~ k(l~ k¡1) for every ~ k 2 f2;:::;mg.
16Proof. First, we prove the result for ~ k = 2. Since pj ¸ pa(l1;S) for every j 2 fl1 + 1;:::;l2 ¡ 1g we have
^ ¾S
j (j) > ^ ¾S
j (l1) by Lemma 2.2 and Lemma 2.3. Therefore,
^ ¾S
l2¡1(j) > ^ ¾S
l2¡1(l1) for every j 2 fl1 + 1;:::;l2 ¡ 1g:
Hence, the set of new-max jobs preceding a(l1;S) according to ^ ¾S
l1¡1 and ^ ¾S
l2¡1 coincide. Consequently,
r(l2;a(l1;S)) = r(l1;a(l1;S))
and we will denote r(a(l1;S)) = r(l1;a(l1;S)). Moreover,
BS(l2;r) = BS(l1;r) for every r 2 f1;:::;r(a(l1;S)) ¡ 1g (A.6)
and
BS(l2;r(a(l1;S))) = BS(l1;a(l1;S)) [ fl1g: (A.7)







































®l1pj ¡ ®jpl2) +
pl2
pl1

























































The third equality is a consequence of equation (A.6) together with the fact that l1 does not become new-











Analogously, one can see that gBS(l2;r(a(l1;S)))l2 ·
pl2
pl1
gBS(l1;r(a(l1;S)))l1. The only di®erence is that the
second equality becomes an inequality by equation (A.7) and the fact that ®l2pl1 ¡®l1pl2 · 0 since ul1 ¸ ul2.
Next, we will show (ii). Note that by de¯nition of r(a(l1;S)) and assumption (4.4) we have
r(a(l1;S)) X
r=¹ r









gBS(l1;r)l1 · 0 for every ¹ r 2 f1;:::;r(a(l1;S))g;
where the ¯rst inequality holds by (i) and the second one by equation (A.9). Therefore, ^ ¾S
l2(l2) > ^ ¾S
l2(l1) by
assumption (4.4) and Lemma 2.3.
Now, let ~ k > 2 and suppose that the result is true for l1;:::;l~ k¡1. Then,
^ ¾S
l~ k¡1(l1) < ^ ¾S
l~ k¡1(l2) < ::: < ^ ¾S
l~ k¡1(l~ k¡1): (A.10)
Since pj ¸ pa(lk;S) for every k 2 f1;:::;~ k¡1g and every j 2 flk+1;:::;lk+1¡1g, we have that ^ ¾S
j (j) > ^ ¾S
j (lk)
by Lemma 2.2 and Lemma 2.3. Therefore, for every k 2 f1;:::;~ k ¡ 1g it follows
^ ¾S
l~ k¡1(j) > ^ ¾S
l~ k¡1(lk) for every j 2 flk + 1;:::;lk+1 ¡ 1g: (A.11)
Hence, for every k 2 f2;:::;~ k ¡ 1g we have that the set of new-max jobs in between a(lk¡1;S) and a(lk;S)
according to ^ ¾S
lk and ^ ¾S
l~ k coincide. Therefore, for k 2 f1;:::;~ k ¡ 1g we have
r(l~ k;a(lk;S)) = r(lk;a(lk;S)) (A.12)
then, we can denote r(a(lk;S)) = r(lk;a(lk;S)). Moreover, for every k 2 f1;:::;~ k ¡ 1g we have
BS(l~ k;r) = BS(lk;r) (A.13)
for every r 2 fr(a(lk¡1;S)) + 1;:::;r(a(lk;S)) ¡ 1g and,
BS(lk;r(a(lk;S))) ½ BS(l~ k;r(a(lk;S)))
18with
BS(l~ k;r(a(lk;S))) n BS(lk;r(a(lk;S))) ½ flk;:::;l~ k¡1g: (A.14)
In order to show (i) take k 2 f1;:::;~ k ¡ 1g and r 2 fr(a(lk¡1;S)) + 1;:::;r(a(lk;S))g, then one can see
that




by using the same kind of arguments as in equation (A.8).




gBS(lk;r)lk · 0 (A.15)
for every ¹ r 2 fr(a(lk¡1;S)) + 1;:::;r(lk;a(lk;S))g. Then, for every k¤ 2 f1;:::;~ k ¡ 1g and every
¹ r 2 fr(a(lk¤¡1;S)) + 1;:::;r(a(lk¤;S))g we have
r(a(l~ k¡1;S)) X
r=¹ r























where the ¯rst inequality holds by (i) and the second one by equation (A.15). Therefore, ^ ¾S
l~ k(l~ k) > ^ ¾S
l~ k(l~ k¡1)
by assumption (4.4) and Lemma 2.3. 2
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Recall that ¾0 = ¾u = (1 ::: n) and fa1;:::;asg is the set of new-max jobs according
to ¾u with a1 < ::: < as. We distinguish three cases.
Case 1: S\fa1;:::;asg = ;. Then, ^ ¾S
i = ¾u for every i 2 S and assertions (i) and (ii) are direct consequence
of the de¯nition of ^ ¾T
i , assertion (iii) follows by Lemma 4.1, and assertion (iv) follows since GT
i ¸ 0 = GS
i
by de¯nition of GT
i .
Case 2: S \ fa1;:::;asg = fau;:::;avg and T \ fa1;:::;asg = fau;:::;awg with au · ::: · av · ::: · aw.
Then, we have ^ ¾S
i = ^ ¾T
i = ¾u for every i 2 S with i < au and ^ ¾S
i = ^ ¾T
i for every i 2 S with i ¸ au. Hence,
assertions (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) are immediate.
Case 3: S \ fa1;:::;asg = fau;:::;avg and T \ fa1;:::;asg = fa~ u;:::;a~ vg with a~ u < au · av · a~ v. Let
S = fiS;:::;jSg and partition S according to (A.5). Let i 2 S and let a be a new-max job according
19to ^ ¾S
i¡1 (^ ¾T
i¡1). During the remaining of this proof we will denote by rS(i;a) (rT(i;a)) the index of the
segment de¯ned by a according to ^ ¾S
i¡1 (^ ¾T
i¡1). Moreover, by si(S) we denote the number of segments before
reordering player i in S.
Note that for every i 2 fiS;:::;aug we have ^ ¾S
i = ¾u and therefore assertions (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv)
follow using the same kind of reasoning as in Case 1.
Subsequently, assume that the result holds for fiS;:::;lk ¡ 1g for some k 2 f1;:::;mg. Then, we have
BT(lk;rT(lk;au¡1) + r) = BS(lk;r) (A.16)
for every r 2 f1;:::;slk(S)g n frS(lk;a(l1;S));:::;rS(lk;a(lk¡1;S))g.
Besides, BT(lk;rT(lk;au¡1) + r) ½ BS(lk;r) for every r 2 frS(lk;a(l1;S));:::;rS(lk;a(lk¡1)) with
BS(lk;r) n BT(lk;rT(lk;au¡1) + r) ½ fl1;:::;lk¡1g: (A.17)
Note that it may be the case that a(lk;S) = a(lk+1;S) for some k 2 f1;:::;k ¡2g. We de¯ne recursively
k¤
w, with w 2 f1;:::;tg, as
k¤
w = minf¹ k 2 fk¤
w¡1 + 1;:::;k ¡ 1gja(l¹ k;S) 6= a(l¹ k¡1;S)g (A.18)
where k¤
0 = 0. Note that ^ ¾S
lk¡1(lk¤
w¡1) < ^ ¾S
lk¡1(lk¤
w) for every w 2 f2;:::;tg by Lemma A.4 (ii).
Then, by equation (A.16) it follows
gBT(lk;rT(lk;au¡1)+r)lk = gBS(lk;r)lk (A.19)
for every r 2 f1;:::;slk(S)g n frS(lk;a(l1;S));:::;rS(lk;a(lk¡1;S))g.











for every w 2 f1;:::;tg.
By de¯nition of rS(lk¤








w · 0 (A.21)




















































20for every ¹ w 2 f1;:::;tg and every ¹ r 2 frS(lk;a(lk¤
¹ w¡1;S))+1;:::;rS(lk;a(lk¤
¹ w;S))g. Here, the ¯rst inequality
holds by equation (A.20) and the second one by equation (A.21).
First, suppose that plk ¸ pau. Then, ^ ¾T
lk(lk) > ^ ¾T
lk(au) by Lemma 2.2. Hence, ^ ¾T
lk(lk) = ^ ¾S
lk(lk) by
equations (A.19) and (A.22), and by assumption (4.4).




r=^ r gBT(lk;r)lk > 0. In such a case ^ ¾T
lk(lk) < ^ ¾S
lk(lk) and ^ ¾T
lk(lk) < ^ ¾T
lk(au), otherwise
^ ¾T
lk(lk) = ^ ¾S
lk(lk) by equation (A.19) and assumption (4.4).
Hence (i) and (ii) are satis¯ed. Assertion (iii) is an immediate consequence of Lemma A.3, and the
fact that lk is not a new-max job according ^ ¾S
lk since plk < pa(lk¡1;S) < pa(lk;S). Assertion (iv) is a direct
consequence of (ii) together with equation (A.19).
Finally, suppose that the result is true for fiS;:::;i ¡ 1g with lk < i < lk+1. Then, we have
BT(i;rT(lk;au¡1) + r) = BS(i;r) (A.23)
and
gBT(i;rT(lk;au¡1)+r)i = gAS(i;r)i (A.24)
for every r 2 f1;:::;r(i;a(lk;S)) ¡ 1g.
Moreover, ^ ¾T
i (i) > ^ ¾T
i (au) by Lemma 2.2. Hence, ^ ¾T
i (i) = ^ ¾S
i (i) by equation (A.24) and assumption (4.4).
Assertion (iii) follows by induction together with Lemma A.3, and (i). Assertion (iv) is a direct consequence
of (i) together with equation (A.24). 2
Proof of Lemma 4.3. Recall that ¾0 = ¾u = (1 ::: n) and fa1;:::;asg is the set of new-max jobs according
to ¾u with a1 < ::: < as. We will distinguish three cases.
Case 1: S \ fa1;:::;asg = ;. Then, ^ ¾S
i = ¾u for every i 2 S and
GS




by de¯nition of hN(i;r).
Case 2: a1 2 S . Then, we have ^ ¾S
i = ^ ¾N







Case 3: a1 62 S, S \ fa1;:::;asg = fau;:::;avg with au · ::: · av. Let S = fiS;:::;jSg and consider the
partition (A.5). Let k 2 f1;:::;mg and let i 2 flk + 1;:::;lk+1 ¡ 1g. By Lemma 4.2 (i) and (iv) we know
21that ^ ¾N
i (i) = ^ ¾S









where the second equality follows by ^ ¾N
i (i) = ^ ¾S
i (i) and the fact that hN(i;r) = 0 for every r ¸ r(i;a(i;S)).
Next, consider lk with k 2 f1;:::;mg. If ^ ¾N
lk(lk) = ^ ¾S
lk(lk) we are in the previous situation. Assume that
^ ¾N
















where the ¯rst equality follows by de¯nition of GS
i and r(i;a(S;i)), the second one by equation (A.19) with
T = N and the fact that BS(i;r) = AS(i;si ¡ r + 1), the third equality is a direct consequence of the
de¯nition of hN(i;r) and the last one follows by equation (A.22) with BS(i;r) = AS(i;si ¡ r + 1) and the
de¯nition of hN(i;r). 2
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